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Brian Langille*  If Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law,
 What is Employment Law a Subset of?
An academic life lived over decades can provide real rewards. One is thinking about 
a subject, such as labour law, over a significant period. Such longer-term speculation 
can lead to interesting questions—such as, what makes labour law a subject anyway? 
A second advantage of academic seniority is the opportunity to sustain longer-term 
relationships with other scholars. Both the temporal and personal advantages are joined 
here because four leading labour law scholars whom I have known for a (sometimes 
very long) while, have written about an essay that I wrote forty years ago. This essay 
is my effort to join them in trying to understand what I was really up to all those years 
ago. The result, borrowing from T.S. Elliot, is “to arrive at the place I began, and see it 
for the first time.”
Une vie universitaire vécue pendant des décennies peut apporter de réelles 
récompenses. On réfléchit à un sujet, tel que le droit du travail, pendant une période 
de temps significative. Une telle réflexion à long terme peut conduire à des questions 
intéressantes, par exemple : qu’est-ce qui fait du droit du travail un sujet de réflexion 
de toute façon? Un deuxième avantage d’une longue expérience universitaire est la 
possibilité d’entretenir des relations à plus long terme avec d’autres universitaires. 
Les avantages temporels et personnels sont réunis ici parce que quatre éminents 
spécialistes du droit du travail que je connais depuis un certain temps (parfois très 
longtemps) ont écrit sur un essai que j’ai rédigé il y a quarante ans. Le présent article 
représente mon effort pour me joindre à eux afin d’essayer de comprendre ce que je 
faisais vraiment il y a toutes ces années. Le résultat, pour emprunter à T.S. Elliot, est 
« d’arriver à l’endroit où j’ai commencé, et de le voir pour la première fois .»
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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Introduction:  “It was Twenty Forty Years Ago Today”
I. The view from “There”




“Every subject studied in the university, or elsewhere, is a structure to be entered into.” 
Northrup Frye, On Education
Introduction: “It was Twenty Forty Years Ago Today”1
Bruce Archibald, Alan Bogg, Mark Freedland, and Claire Mummé 
constitute a formidable labour law foursome. I deeply appreciate their 
taking time to reflect upon “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” 
(“Subset”)2 forty years after its publication. Mark Freedland is widely 
and justly regarded and respected as our discipline’s leading thinker on 
the very idea of employment.3 He also taught me labour law at Oxford 
many years ago. Alan Bogg is one of our discipline’s most philosophically 
sophisticated scholars, dedicated to the highest academic standards, and 
someone with whom I have enjoyed spirited exchanges over the past 
decade or so.4 Claire Mummé is a rising star in labour law’s constellation, 
and it was my privilege to have been, a few years ago, a member of her 
1. With apologies and thanks to Sgt Pepper.
2. Brian Langille, “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law” (1981) 31 UTLJ 200 [“Subset”].
3. See Mark Freedland, The Contact of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Mark 
Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Mark 
Freedland & Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
4. See Alan Bogg, “Labour Law and Trade Unions: Autonomy and Betrayal” in Alan Bogg, 
Cathryn Costello, ACL Davies, & Jeremias Prassl, eds, The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015); Alan Bogg “The Constitution of Capabilities: The Case of Freedom of Association” 
in Brian Langille, ed, The Capability Approach to Labour Law, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2019); Brian Langille & Benjamin Oliphant, “The Legal Structure of Freedom of Association” 
(2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ 249 [Langille & Oliphant, “The Legal Structure of Freedom of Association”]; 
Brian Langille “What is Labour Law? Implications of the Capability Approach” in Brian Langille, ed, 
The Capability Approach to Labour Law, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) [“What is 
Labour Law?”].
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Doctoral Defence committee.5 Bruce Archibald came before all of that—
we were both at Dalhousie Law School as students where he was a year 
ahead of me and where he was, a few years later, my colleague. He has been 
a sterling friend and supporter from the beginning and like our mentor, 
Innis Christie, he has combined academic labour law with public service, 
for example, at the Labour Relations Board and as an Arbitrator. I am 
humbled and thrilled that this powerful quartet has read, reflected upon, 
responded to, and best of all, enlarged our, or at least my, understanding 
of “Subset.”
 I also owe thanks to two others—Harry Arthurs and the late Innis 
Christie. Let me explain why. Alan Bogg begins his paper by noting that 
he was 8 years old when “Subset” was written. I was 28. I was also a 
third-year Assistant Professor teaching labour law at Dalhousie Law 
School. That I was a labour lawyer, an academic, and at Dalhousie, I owe 
to Innis Christie6 who was my teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend. It 
was typical of Innis to suggest to the Labour Law Casebook Group7 (of 
which Innis was a member and which was headed by Harry Arthurs) that 
I should be invited to their academic conference to be held at Queen’s 
University in the fall of 1980. I wrote “Subset” for that conference. I 
can still recall, vividly, the great relief, and sense of deep satisfaction, 
when I got a call from Innis several days before the conference to say he 
had read the draft and liked it a lot. That meant a great deal to me. Not 
simply because he was my “maestro,” as Italian colleagues would put it, 
but because “Subset” was trying to say something about how we should 
understand the discipline that Innis had almost single-headedly created in 
Canada—Employment Law. 
When I presented the paper to the Labour Law Casebook Group at 
the meeting in 1980, the positive, if searching, reactions of others—Paul 
Weiler, Bernie Adell, David Beatty, Rob Prichard, and Harry Arthurs 
among them—also meant a lot. Especially Harry. Harry was then, and 
still is, the Dean of Canadian labour law. You can draw a line under 
Harry’s name and then debate, if you are so inclined, who comes second. 
5. Claire Mummé, That Indispensable Figment of the Legal Mind: The Contract of Employment at 
Common Law in Ontario, 1890-1979 (PhD Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2013). 
6. My labour law Professor at Dalhousie, later Dean of Law. Also Chair of the NS Labour Relations 
Board, respected labour arbitrator, public servant, and much more, including being the “founding 
father” of Employment Law in Canada. Innis was salt of the earth, tough as they come, competitive as 
hell, smart as all get out, and a demanding scholar who asked a lot of himself and others. He also loved 
a good time. Innis died in 2009. I will always be in his debt. I know that many others feel the same.
7. A group of labour law teachers from across Canada who (still) publish the “casebook” used to 
teach in Canadian law schools—now in its 9th edition; Labour Law Casebook Group, Labour and 
Employment Law: Cases, Materials and Commentaries, 9th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018).
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He was intimidating. He spoke in whole paragraphs. All of the time. He 
still does. It was Harry who developed the line, discussed in the papers 
collected here, that I was playing with individual rights in a way that might 
be seen as dangerous for the enterprise of collective labour law. I fought 
back as best I could—and the final line of the published paper—“I do not 
regard this as a cry for individual over collective rights, but rather for a 
consideration of the proper impact of our publicly expressed values upon 
private arrangements”8—is, as I recall, word for word, the final sentence 
in my verbal response to Harry’s critique. 
As it turned out Harry, and the Group, invited me to join them.9 More 
than that—they came around to my way of thinking. They did so in a 
remarkable manner—by deciding to move from a labour law casebook 
(the casebook I had studied as Innis’ student)—meaning a casebook solely 
about collective labour law—to a comprehensive casebook about all of 
our labour law, that is, both employment and labour law.10 “Subset” was, 
with the support of David Beatty and Rob Prichard, published in the 
University of Toronto Law Journal in 1980. That publishing event was 
not un-instrumental in my being offered a Visiting Professorship at the 
University of Toronto the next year. I have been there ever since. The 
paper was important in my career. But here is an important point—perhaps 
my most important point in this essay—it was not until many years later 
that I came to understand, and then only gradually, what I had written in 
1981. In fact, it was 25 years later that I was first able to write an extended 
essay about what was going on in “Subset”—at least as far as I could tell 
at that point.11 I return to this truth below.
I would like to address all the thoughtful, critical, and creative points 
made by my four colleagues in their essays. But I have not been able to 
do that—their papers are simply too rich and full of interesting ideas, all 
carefully and generously presented. I have had to be selective. The central 
idea that I have chosen to pursue is to respond to a way of reading “Subset” 
shared by Alan and Mark. It is a reading they “see,” but I explain why that 
reading was and is not apparent to me—and why I agree with Mark’s 
8. I was also citing Harry’s own words to him, see Harry Arthurs “Free collective bargaining in a 
regulated society” in Frances Bairstow, The Direction of Labour Policy in Canada (Montreal: McGill 
University Industrial Relations Centre, 1977).
9. And I have been there ever since—now, I think, as the most senior member.
10. I remember Harry going to the blackboard, drawing two grids, and saying something like “OK, if 
we are going to do this, here is our first big editorial decision—do we go regime by regime (common 
law, collective bargaining, labour standards legislation) or issue by issue (dismissal, discrimination, 
managerial authority, etc)?” Great stuff. (We decided on regime by regime).
11. Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, Boundaries 
and Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) [Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages”].
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suggestion of another reading that is much closer to my intentions as the 
writer of “Subset.” There are lessons for me—about the need for clarity of 
expression and careful use of language (on my part), especially if there is 
risk of a paper being read abroad. But perhaps we can learn something by 
thinking a bit about why Mark and Alan, from the UK, see and share so 
easily that possible interpretation while Bruce, Claire and I, Canadians all, 
do not. This is, I hope, in line with Mark’s and Alan’s careful and deeply 
informed accounts of the distinct evolutions of our discipline in our two 
countries. 
I. The view from “There”
Both Mark and Alan say that “Subset” can be read as adopting the 
following, potentially unsettling, line of thought. In Canada there was 
and still is an important distinction between “labour law,” which is law 
about and for unionized workers, and employment law, which is all of 
the rest of the law relevant to employers and employees—and thus all 
the law that unorganized employees have.12 They read “Subset” as saying 
that this gives us one law for the “haves” (organized workers) and one for 
the “have-nots” (the unorganized). All of this is correct in my view. Mark 
then suggests that it is the burden of “Subset” to invert this relationship 
so that what we know as “labour law” should be “subordinated to” 
what we know as “employment law.”13 This would be indeed a “deeply 
provocative suggestion.”14 Alan uses similar language, also speaking of an 
“elevation”15 of “individualistic” employment law and the “undermining”16 
of “collective” labour law, suggesting that this is “highly provocative… 
To modern eyes…even more acute.”17 This is because such a normative 
stance at least potentially “downgrades [or represents a “devaluation” 
of18] the collective dimensions of working life.”19 It also “subverts” the 
standard view of history that unions were instrumental in the development 
12. Please note, as I was at pains to make clear in “Subset” (see supra note 2 at 220-221)—this is 
NOT saying that employment law is for the unorganized and not for the organized. Employment law 
generally applies to both groups. It is simply saying that employment law is all that the unorganized 
have by way of law. Here is how I put it at 220:
“[…] the overwhelming fact is that by and large employment standards legislation applies 
to employees under collective agreements. The arguments for mutual exclusion are 
rejected. The legislation is paternalistic even were equality of bargaining power is assured 
by the procedural device of collective bargaining.”
13. Mark Freedland, “Employment Law Revisited” in this volume at 2.
14. Ibid at 2.
15. Alan Bogg, “‘Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law’ Revisited” in this volume at 6. 
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid at 7.
19. Ibid at 6.
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of legislated work standards.20 All of this is, it is said, generously, 
undertaken with what might be good motives and normative ambition21— 
a desire to improve the lot of the have-nots in the name of the liberal 
values of equal “concern and respect,”22 and the need to let “public values” 
trump “private” ones. In addition, despite its shortcomings, “Subset” was 
“prescient”23 in foreshadowing, at a point when it was not as clear as it 
is today, the real-world decline of collective labour relations and the rise 
of individual employment law. I thank Alan and Mark for their persistent 
kindness in spite of what appears to be a piercing critique.
II. The view from “Here”
But my defence is, I am afraid, a complete one. In “Subset” I did not 
promote these ideas. I have not promoted them in the interim. And I 
don’t promote them now. The point of “Subset” is not to take our existing 
understanding of the two fields of labour and employment law and then 
to propose what Mark wonderfully calls a “hostile takeover”24 of one by 
the other. Rather, the point of “Subset” was to offer a new way of seeing 
the two existing parts of our law as part of a newly perceived and greater 
whole. That greater whole I called, for good reason, but with some 
obvious resulting confusion, “Employment Law.” This move required us, 
in order to have a coherent view of the new and unified field, to start to 
work through the old bifurcated views, bit by bit, to see how, at both a 
substantive and procedural level, coherence within the new broader frame, 
could and should be achieved. That was the burden of “Subset.”
I think all of this is clear on the face of “Subset.” Alan gets this right 
straight off the bat by stating that “‘Subset’ provides a basic enquiry into 
the coherence of a legal discipline.”25 I can see more clearly now than then 
that this is indeed the case. At times Alan seems at home with this type of 
academic, or structural, or “pedagogic”26 exercise. At other times he seems 
to lose patience with it.27 But this is the key to “Subset.” Alan is surely right 
20. Ibid at 7.
21. Freedland, supra note 13 at 15.
22. The Dworkinian language of the time, which I adopted in “Subset,” supra note 2.
23. Bogg, supra note 15 at 2.
24. Freedland, supra note 13 at 25.
25. Bogg, supra note 15 at 3.
26. Ibid at 8.
27. Ibid at 6: 
The pragmatist orientation of UK labour law might well have regarded structural questions 
about the organization of legal norms as an irritating scholastic distraction from the serious 
business of making the world of work a better place. Let the focus be on organizing workers, 
not legal norms. In certain respects, therefore, Langille’s preoccupation in ‘Subset’ could 
be viewed as a relatively parochial enterprise that was relevant to North American labour 
lawyers and rather peripheral in the UK context.
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in saying that this sort of inquiry is not a judgement-free one. And I think 
it is clear on the face of “Subset” that I put my normative commitments 
on the table. But even though Alan is right about what “Subset” was about 
when I was writing it, I did not have the intellectual resources at the time 
to know that was what I was doing. I was, as I hope to make clear below, 
playing within established categories, without much of a clue about what 
made for a legal category in the first place. All of that came much later. 
Now I can read Alan’s claim in a richer way—and he and I have had many 
exchanges about these matters. But this also means that looking back 40 
years, I must be careful not to read too much into “Subset” of what I now 
can see it to be about.
Alan’s accurate claim about “Subset’s” mission is also the key to 
seeing the limitations and problem with “Subset.” I simply start “Subset” 
by taking, as a given, the bifurcated state of Canadian law. I do then 
propose a unified view. But it was a unified view of “employment law.” 
That is, the law of the employer-employee relationship. Bruce is right—I 
“bought into,” took for granted, accepted without thought, the standard, 
often unarticulated, view of the time (what I now call “The Received 
Wisdom”—more on this later).28 What I did was organize all of that into 
a unified account. And Alan is right that I was “not so concerned with this 
problem of context”29—ie with delimiting the field in other available ways 
(“work,” or “productive labour,” etc). But here is the key idea: Alan’s 
point is more profound than it appears—it was not so much that I was not 
“concerned with,” as I was not aware of the possibility of doing that. It is 
true that these days, 40 years later, thinking about how to delimit the field 
in a new way is basically all I do.30 But back then I simply took the existing 
legal practices, sets of understandings, bodies of law—which constituted 
both employment law and labour law and offered a standard way of seeing 
them—and provided a new and “unified” interpretation. And I did so for 
reasons I set out in the paper—a better understanding of the discipline. 
To put it another way—I think Alan simply has the advantage of having 
been eight years old at the time of “Subset.” He did not have to live with 
the limitations of the time. All I can say is that I did my best with the 
28. Bruce Archibald, “Labour Law as a Subset of Employment Law? Up-dating Langille’s Insights 
with a Capabilities Approach” in this volume at 44: 
[I]n the end, Langille in 1981 adopted the orthodox protective rational for employment/
labour law (redressing inequality of bargaining power as between employers and 
employees), while hedging it about with qualifications, such as the need for human rights 
protections against irrational considerations, eg discrimination on the grounds of sex or 
race.
29. Bogg, supra note 15 at 5.
30. See discussion at 16 below.
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intellectual resources I had at my disposal. “The past is a foreign country—
they do things differently there.”31 I know this is true—I used to live there. 
I hope readers today can excuse this limitation on my thinking. I have 
now come to see that my ignorance, and my way of proceeding then, are 
both revealing and important. But at the time, what I was saying literally 
went without saying. It was what everyone, who knew anything about 
employment law or labour law, knew. “Employment” was, for those of us 
who lived in that foreign country of the past, a “natural” category. It was 
the central “platform”32 upon which labour rights, in both employment law 
and labour law, were constructed because it was the central legal platform 
for work. Employment was important both intrinsically and instrumentally. 
Employers and employees were the dramatis personae central to the two 
leading legal productions then running. The legal category of contract was 
the legal stage upon which they both performed. The reality of “inequality 
of bargaining power” was the menacing threat that animated the action in 
both scripts. What was threatened in both settings? What was the moral 
core of the story? It was the liberal instinct and demand for a requirement 
of justice in employment (having returned from Oxford and attending 
Dworkin’s lectures and reading his work I used the language of “equal 
concern and respect” in “Subset”33). This was the deep morality on display 
on both legal stages. That is what made the show “important” and not 
merely a display of technical legal tinkering.
At least, that was my view. That is what “Subset” says. I think it was 
right. And my basic point was that once you see this, you see that all that 
separated employment law and labour law was a lack of imagination, a 
failure to draw back our lens (just) far enough to see a single stage with 
a larger, and more interesting, and complex legal production. A lot of the 
benefit of the new view would be to see common cause for our two isolated 
legal stories. But also, to grasp that while sharing common fears and desired 
ends, they adopted different means, one procedural, one substantive, 
for overcoming the former and securing the latter. This required seeing 
those different means as resting on different judgements about how best 
to proceed—strong paternalism on the one hand and (possible) collective 
voice/enhanced power at the bargaining table on the other. Seeing all this 
31. LP Hartley, The Go-Between (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953).
32. “Subset,” supra note 2 at 202: “The employment relationship is a central organizational 
mechanism in our society, and it is through the employment relationship that the state has in large 
measure attempted to ensure that a social minimum is attained through a ‘floor’ of basic standards.” It 
was not until much later that I began to use the word “platform”: see Brian Langille, “Labour Policy in 
Canada—New Platform, New Paradigm” (2002) 28:1 Canadian Public Policy 133 [“Labour Policy”].
33. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
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does not solve our problems. It just makes some of them, which existed all 
along, explicit, and tractable. And in “Subset” I took a limited stab at how 
our ultimate normative goals could help reconcile some of the tensions 
made plain when we tell one legal story, not two, where the different 
means of action now unfold on the same stage. I think most of these efforts 
were and are uncontroversial—for example, that human rights will still be 
a problem in majoritarian collective bargaining regimes.
All of that I think was worthwhile. It also had a real impact on how we 
taught our subject in Canada. And in teaching that unified course over the 
years I learned more about just how important the unified view of “Subset” 
was. I came to see that if you studied just the common law, or simply the 
substantive employment law statutes, or only collective bargaining law, 
you would not see that many of our important cases, the sort of case that 
makes it to the Supreme Court of Canada, are interesting just because 
they involve an overlap, either substantively, or procedurally, or both, 
between more than one of our “three regimes.” If you study only one 
regime you will not even be aware of the intersections you are crossing, 
you will cause accidents you do not even know you participated in, and 
do damage to our law and to workers. The job of a good labour lawyer 
is to be aware of all of this, be equipped with the detailed knowledge 
of the procedural complexities this visits upon us (can/must this client 
go to arbitration, to court, or to an administrative tribunal (for example, 
The Human Rights Tribunal)?) Only one? More than one? If they can 
go to any of those, what law will be applied? And most important, how 
do we achieve just and substantive results within each of our labour law 
regimes without doing violence to the others?34 Indeed, that idea of “three 
regimes”—not employment and labour, but common law, substantive 
statutes, and collective bargaining law—came gradually to me through 
years of teaching. And that idea led me to my first insight into a deeper 
understanding of what “Subset” was all about. As promised above, more 
on this below.
One final word about my use of the idea of “public values,” something 
about which Alan in particular has much useful to say. “Subset” deploys the 
idea of public “values.” It does not so much argue for as point out that the 
old categories of employment and labour law are best seen as sharing those 
values (seeking to provide some concern and respect in an important part 
34. There are many great teachable “disaster” cases demonstrating this truth. See, for one “grade A 
large” example, Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970, 95 DLR (4th) 
577. By the end of a unified course in labour law—when all three regimes are “on the table”—we 
spend most of our time reading recent, almost always SCC cases, in just this way.
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of our lives where it would otherwise not be manifested: employment), and 
that they see a common obstacle to securing them: inequality of bargaining 
power. But this is a matter of public values, not public or private law, 
nor collective or individual law. Our public values do not map directly 
or exclusively onto public law or private law, or collective or individual 
law. I think this is Alan’s point in part. But I also think he may miss a 
rather simple, perhaps too simple, point I was trying to make. Collective 
bargaining is bargaining. It may be more than that, but it is, legally, just 
that. Agency, freedom of contract, voice, are important. But bargaining 
outcomes are distinct from public, statutory, democratically mandated, 
law and are justified in different ways. Further, it must be recalled that 
democracy is more than majoritarianism and equal representation for all. 
It is also about equal liberty for all. It is about basic freedoms, now Charter 
freedoms, as well as democratic participatory rights. And thinking about 
the concrete relationship of the mechanism of collective voice/power (the 
old labour law) to basic legislative pronouncements (the old employment 
law) is a matter of considering when basic judgements about pretty bare 
social “minimums” (minimum wage for example), or fundamental rights 
(against discrimination, for example), should or should not give way to a 
(possibly) enhanced bargaining power and voice. That is the job of good 
modern labour lawyers—to work this out. In “Subset” I outlined some 
concrete elements of this task and took a view on some of them. My own 
views on some of the details of this—for example, on the application by 
arbitrators of employment standards legislation—have evolved over time 
(as I decided concrete cases as an arbitrator, for example).35 But the basic 
idea of “Subset” is that a unified approach is a much better, and required, 
way of proceeding than the then intellectual/academic apartheid that 
dominated at the time. And there is no systematic bias here for or against 
any way of pursuing our goals, ie in favour of the old employment law. 
There is a bias in favour only of our goals, our ends. But not our means. 
And the issues I raised in “Subset” seemed and seem amenable to rational 
reflection in reconciling our means in a coherent way—both procedurally 
and substantively.
III.	What	accounts	for	the	differing	views	from	“There”	and	“Here?”
Mark and Alan are surely right. I did, it seems, make a mistake, and 
evidently did cause confusion for some, in selecting the label “employment 
35. See Curtis Products Corp v Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 500 (Layoff 
Grievance) (2002), 110 LAC (4th) 193 (Langille).
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law” to identify the new unified account. They are right that I would have 
expressed myself more clearly if I had followed Mark’s advice:
I think that [Brian] saw the need to merge both ‘labour law’ and 
‘employment law’ into a single over-arching discipline with a new and 
composite identity. If so, it was I think a misstep to use the terminology 
of ‘employment law’ to denote this new composite discipline. There 
are signs in the article that he was experimenting with ‘the Law of 
the Employment Relationship’ as a new composite terminology, and 
we should read the article as if he had boldly gone right down that 
terminological path. So the slogan ‘labour law is a subset of employment 
law’ would expand out into the more elaborate proposition that ‘Labour 
Law, as also Employment Law itself, is a sub-set of The Law of the 
Employment Relationship.’ That would have been far too cumbersome 
to form an arresting title for his article, but I like to think that it would 
more accurately have expressed its real intention.36 
I take this point. Claire makes it as well.37 However, I still understand 
my choice of terminology. This is for the following reason—once you 
see, as I was suggesting, that the new overall category I was describing 
comprehended the various ways of bringing justice to the employment 
relationship, “employment law” seems the most economical and accurate 
label. This was and is the logic of my title. (But, as I have already 
mentioned, this fixation on the category of employment is also the 
intellectual limitation of “Subset.”)
Let me return to the question I mentioned earlier—why do Mark and 
Alan see what they see and read “Subset” they way they do, while Bruce, 
Claire and I do not? Is there something going on here, as perhaps there 
always is when comparative (labour in this case) law is the project? As 
Mark and Alan make clear in their nuanced accounts of the history of, and 
struggle for, the rhetorical high ground (“employment” versus “labour” as 
proxies for “individual’ versus “collective”) during the evolution of our 
discipline in the UK, some of it is just that—rhetorical maneuvering and 
positioning, often with an explicit agenda of making your true values clear. 
But I wonder if there is something not political or rhetorical, but rather 
juridical, at the base of the different attitudes of Mark and Alan, as opposed 
to Bruce, Claire and me. They read “Subset” as plausibly proposing a legal 
hierarchy of the two existing legal categories with employment law on 
top. But this is very hard for Canadians to understand. First, employment 
law, understood as the old category, could never have effected a “hostile 
36. Freedland, supra note 13 at 26 [emphasis in original].
37. Claire Mummé, “Unifying the Field: Mapping the Relationship Between Work Law Regimes in 
Ontario, then and now” in this volume at 2, n 9. 
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takeover” of the old legal category of labour law because in Canada there 
was and is no legal vehicle for such a coup.38 This is a basic juridical point, 
one which is fundamental to Canadian collective labour law. Second, 
beyond the juridical point there lie deep and unbridgeable normative 
waters denying the possibility of such a takeover. Let me deal with these 
two points in turn.39
In Canada, unionized employees under a collective agreement do 
not have a contract of employment. The only contract in existence is the 
collective agreement between the union and the employer. Employees are 
not party to that contract. It binds employees, who would be “third party 
beneficiaries” at common law, because the legislation says it does.40 So, 
for example, unionized employees cannot sue their employer in court for 
wrongful dismissal. This is not because there is no term in their contract 
protecting them in this way—but because there is no contract at all. (Then, 
on top of that point of substantive law, there is the procedural point that 
no one can go to court to enforce a collective agreement—they must 
proceed to arbitration.) Collective agreement terms are not “incorporated” 
into individual contracts of employment. (Nor, directly, are employment 
standards.) That is not how it works in Canada. In Canada there is no 
unitary basis for our subject. So, thinking in terms of individual contracts 
in the collective sphere is an attempt, as Bora Laskin famously put it, 
to “re-enter a world which has ceased to exist.”41 Or, as Harry Arthurs 
put it wonderfully, describing the relationship between the common law 
of contract and the collective bargaining regime, “the umbilical cord has 
been severed.”42 This lack of an individual, or collective, contract to which 
individual workers under a collective agreement are a party explains why 
the “duty of fair representation” is so important and is discussed at some 
length in “Subset.” Bruce makes this general point well and expresses 
it by saying labour law had an “autonomy”43 that was well established 
in 1981. And he points out that this autonomy is now even more secure 
in light of the subsequent “constitutionalization” of our collective, but 
38. McGavin Toastmaster Ltd v Ainscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718 at 725, 54 DLR (3d) 1: “The common 
law as it applies to individual employment contracts is no longer relevant to employer-employee 
relations governed by a collective agreement.”
39. Today, I would call the first of these points a point of legal grammar, and the second a point of 
legal narrative.
40. See eg s 56 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A: “A collective 
agreement is, subject to and for the purposes of this Act, binding upon the employer and upon the 
trade union that is a party to the agreement whether or not the trade union is certified and upon the 
employees in the bargaining unit defined in the agreement.”
41. Peterboro Lock Manufacturing Co Ltd, [1953] OLAA No 2 at para 8, [1954] 4 LAC 1499.
42. Port Arthur Shipbuilding (1966), [1967] 1 OR 272 at 276, 60 DLR (2d) 214.
43. Archibald, supra note 28 at 8.
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not individual, labour law. For Canadians it has always been difficult 
to conceive of employment law dominating labour law for this basic 
reason. Just as the old category of employment law, tied to the contract 
of employment, has difficulty claiming dominion over new “fissured” or 
“fracked”44 work arrangements (where the tactic “de-contractualization” 
has been deployed45) so too it could never, in our law, assume a dominion 
over collective labour law. The limitations of the old employment law were 
profound, and so was its juridical separation from the old labour law. That 
is the juridical—or as I prefer to call it now, “grammatical” legal point.
There is another, more important, reason that Canadian labour lawyers 
in 1980 would find it difficult to interpret the title “Labour Law is a Subset 
of Employment Law” as proposing a hierarchy of the two familiar parts of 
our law with employment law on top. This is not a point of legal grammar 
but of normative narrative. Labour lawyers at the time of “Subset” had 
been raised on the “mother’s milk” of the moral superiority of labour 
law. The thinking was and is straightforward: a generous employer might 
graciously “negotiate” decent terms of employment. Or a paternalistic state 
might intervene to provide the same terms via legislation. But only labour 
law opened the door for employees “doing it for themselves.” This idea 
was present from the beginning—in the views of the founder of Canadian 
Labor Law—Bora Laskin. And as I tell my students, Bora begat Harry, 
and Harry begat Paul—Paul Weiler that is. And it is in the words of Paul 
Weiler that we can find the best articulation of this idea. In 1980, Weiler, in 
one of Canadian labour law’s most famous passages, argued that collective 
bargaining is indeed important because it can deliver economic gains and 
because it introduces the rule of law (as opposed to managerial discretion) 
in the workplace. But, Weiler rightly insisted that these two features are not 
the identifying virtues of collective bargaining and that the true defence 
of collective bargaining does not reside in these two “deliverables,” 
important as they are. This, he explains, is because “collective bargaining 
is not simply an instrument for pursuing external ends, whether these be 
mundane monetary gains or the erection of a private rule of law to protect 
the dignity of the worker in the face of managerial authority.”46 Indeed, 
these external ends can, after all, be provided by benign management or 
the state (via employment standards). “Rather, collective bargaining is 
44. I owe this, as with much else, to Harry Arthurs.
45. Langille, “The Political Economy of Decency” in ILO 100: Law for Social Justice (Geneva: 
ILO, 2019) 503 at 525 [Langille, “The Political Economy of Decency”].
46. Paul C Weiler, Reconcilable	Differences:	New	Directions	in	Canadian	Labour	Law (Carswell, 
1980) at 33 [Reconcilable	Differences].
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intrinsically valuable as an experiment in self-government.”47 This basic 
idea was also expressed in wonderful words by the Supreme Court of 
Canada which has contrasted the “self-advancement of working people” 
with “legislative protectionism.”48 This morality, which we now see as 
constitutionally guaranteed and constituted as “freedom of association,”49 
is basic to the Canadian way of thinking. 
“Subset” in no way challenges these truths, nor would it have been 
read by Canadian labour lawyers as doing so at the time. What “Subset” 
does do is show us that as part of a new and greater whole of the law 
aimed at justice in employment, these preeminent virtues of collective 
bargaining must be seen as part of that larger whole. In this new light the 
evident virtues of “the self-advancement of working people” and “self-
government” have, as in our democracy in general, to be read as subject to 
protection of fundamental rights, and other basic public values. “Subset” 
also reminds us that we should not romanticize about the achievement 
of Weiler’s three goals in the real world. “Subset” insists that we keep in 
mind that the virtues Weiler describes, all three of them, are in no way 
guaranteed by collective bargaining, which is, after all, simply bargaining. 
Those in many sectors of the economy with few skills, who are easily 
replaceable, in a time of high unemployment, may gain nothing by acting 
together. It also assumes, as Claire explores, a certain labour market reality 
of the standard employment relationship. And defenders of collective 
voice also had to make room for protection of fundamental rights and 
avoidance of abuse of majoritarian power.50 But “Subset” agrees that the 
freedom of association is valuable for just the reasons Weiler sets out.51 It 
simply reminds us of other truths we hold dear and of our need, as lawyers, 
to work through their integration in a coherent and justified unified field.
These ideas may or may not help explain the difference in interpretation 
of “Subset” on offer in the other papers. But I do know that in my thinking 
then and now, it did not occur to me that my proposal would be read as 
Mark and Alan were inclined, at least initially. And I do know that the legal 
vehicle for a “hostile takeover,” which may be available in the UK, is not 
available in Canada. Finally, I do now know that Mark and Alan see what 
47. Ibid at 33.
48. Lavigne v OPSEU, [1991] 2 SCR 211 at 296, 81 DLR (4th) 545, Justice Wilson [emphasis 
added]. 
49. There was no Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1981.
50. See Steele v Louisville & Nashville Railway Co, 323 US 192 (1944) for an example of collective 
bargaining being used to pursue discriminatory aims.
51. Words that I have continued to rely on, down the years—see Langille, “Labour Law’s Back 
Pages,” supra note 11.
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it is I was trying to say, but I also take their point that I was also putting 
an unseen (at least “from here”) terminological obstacle in my own path.
Conclusion:		Looking	back	with	hindsight	(and	still	finding	unanswered	
questions)—What	is	employment	law	a	subset	of?
I cannot remember exactly how or even when I came upon the idea or title 
“Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law.”52 A deeper thought—I 
cannot recall why I became interested in the basic idea that animated the 
writing of “Subset” and that Alan has accurately identified—the idea of 
“the coherence of a legal discipline.”53 But I do know that the instinct, 
primitive though it was at the time,54 that this was a fundamental project, 
is one that has stayed with me. Teaching at the University of Toronto, 
where many leading private and public law theorists take the idea of the 
internal morality and coherence of law seriously, certainly has not hurt. 
But what surprises me most is that my ideas of what universities are for, 
what academic freedom demands by way of independent thought, what 
it is Professors can and should try to do in teaching a subject, and what 
important scholarship consists of,55 have all evolved over a lifetime in a 
way that is traceable back to the basic approach to what is important and 
on display in “Subset.” 
But seeing this took a long time. It took me decades to get to the 
intellectual terroir that Alan, Bruce, Claire and Mark now casually 
command, and to the ability to ask the large questions they ask about how 
legal fields are delimited. And this “seeing” turned out to be a complex 
phenomenon—perhaps it is a form of “reflective equilibrium”—where 
my prior thinking not only informed my subsequent thoughts but my 
prior thoughts also are placed in a new light as reflection carries on. This 
is dramatically the case with “Subset.” It is simply true that it took me 
decades to see the real meaning and value, and limitations, of that early 
piece. And it was only 25 years later that I could begin to write out at 
length what I had really put my finger on—something larger and more 
significant than I could comprehend at the time.56
Bruce has generously traced important developments in my thinking—
for example the shift in my normative sources away from Dworkin and 
towards Sen and the ideas of human freedom and the Capability Approach. 
52. I do recall Innis liked it and started to use it regularly.
53. Bogg, supra note 15 at 3.
54. See supra note 28, where Bruce points out that I took for granted what I now call the “Received 
Wisdom” of labour law.
55. For very real inspiration on these points see Northrop Frye, On Education (Toronto: Fitzhenry & 
Whiteside, 1988).
56. See Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages,” supra note 11.
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He has also, along with Alan, Mark, and Claire, recounted the fundamental 
changes in the real world of work. And Bruce has further explained how 
those real-world changes are linked to and dealt with in developments in 
my thinking about our subject, and to my widening of my set of normative 
concerns, to meet our new realities. He sees that I am a long way from the 
Langille of “Subset.” All of this is generously recounted. I do not wish to 
repeat, in any detail, what I have said elsewhere about those issues.
But, I can see now some even more basic continuities in the evolution 
of my thinking—continuities which the reflections of my colleagues have 
made even more evident to me. At the most basic level, there is the core 
idea that ideas matter. That the world of the legal imagination matters. That 
the basic structure of our thinking about our subject is of great importance. 
In some sense that is where all the action is. The rest is just details. The 
key questions, always, are: “the details of what?” “Why these details?”.
In “Subset” I was clearly under the unarticulated influence of that 
basic idea—that the fundamental structure of our discipline matters. At the 
same time, this basic idea was underdeveloped. I was prepared to simply 
take the legal world as I found it. I simply accepted that my subject was, 
as everyone seemed to agree, about “justice in employment.” My insight 
was that what everyone saw as two subjects addressing this issue were 
best viewed as one—forcing us to openly seek a new level of coherence 
adequate to the task. We were of course addressing all the issues at stake 
anyway, in cases of the sort I discuss in “Subset,” but blindly, without 
seeing the true task at hand. In my view taking a “unified view” of our 
subject was an important advance in our thinking.
But 25 years later I was able to articulate something I had gradually 
come to over years of teaching, writing and thinking about our new 
“unified” subject. I came to what I regard as a deeper understanding 
of how the coherence of legal subjects such as labour law is “made 
available,” or “works.” That is, I came to see the real role played by my 
proposed new view, which I now call the “Received Wisdom,” which I 
had merely described in “Subset.” In my later work this is expressed in 
the idea that subject matters such as labour law (but also, for example, 
family law, environmental law, trade law)57 must have what I came to call 
a “constituting narrative.”58 This is an account of the discipline which 
57. Brian Langille, “What is International Labour Law for?” (2009) 3:1 Law and Ethics of Human 
Rights  48 at 50 [Langille, “What is International Labour Law for?”]; Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s 
Theory of Justice” in Brian Langille & Guy Davidov, eds, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) [Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice”].
58. See eg  Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages,” supra note 11 and Langille, “Labour Law’s 
Theory of Justice,” supra note 57.
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must accomplish three missions—describe the part of the empirical 
world being carved out for examination, provide the legal concepts and 
categories required to frame that part of reality in a way that reasonably 
satisfies the demands of the rule of law, and explain to us why it is an 
important area of study—ie provide a normative	justification for this legal 
project (ie tell us why it is important to worry about).59 All labour lawyers 
know, even if implicitly, some such story. It tells them what issues are their 
issues, what cases and statutes to read, provides them with a set of legal 
concepts that frame the world they know is their world, and provides a 
moral explanation of why we need and have the part of our law (regarding 
which individual lawyers may take the “internal point of view,” or not). It 
explains how it is possible to have specialized labour law firms, Ministries 
of Labour, the International Labour Organization (ILO).60
I came to this view of the central role of constituting narratives 
gradually, and via a long diversion into the “trade and labour” debates,61 
then international labor standards,62 ILO law,63 and what is sometimes 
called “labour law and development.64 It was along that long and winding 
road that I encountered the work of Amartya Sen, after reading his 
1999 book Development as Freedom.65 It was also my thinking about 
international law that led me to see more clearly how domestic labour 
law “worked.” This occurred because I came to see that there was a 
dominant understanding of ILO law—a view which I came to believe 
was unhelpful.66 But I also came to see that this view of international law 
was “driven” by our standard account of domestic law.67 It was only then, 
after my encounter with international law that I could begin to understand 
the power, and limitations, of such “constituting narratives.” Almost 
immediately, another legal dimension opened, unexpectedly, for me, and 
many others—when the Supreme Court of Canada liberated section 2(d) of 
59. See eg Langille &  Oliphant, “The Legal Structure of Freedom of Association,” supra note 4 at 
251.
60. Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages,” supra note 11 & Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of 
Justice,” supra note 57.
61. Brian Langille, “‘Labour Standards in the Globalized Economy’ and The Free Trade/Fair Trade 
Debate” in Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell, eds, International Labour Standards and 
Economic Interdependence (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1994) 229.
62. Brian Langille, “Eight Ways to Think About International Labour Standards” (1997) 31 Journal 
of World Trade 27.
63. Langille, “What is International Labour Law for?,” supra note 57.
64. Langille, “What is Labour Law?,” supra note 4.
65. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Oxford Press, 1999).
66. Langille, “What is International Labour Law for?,” supra note 57; Brian Langille “Core Labour 
Rights—The True Story (A Reply to Alston)” (2005) 16:3 Eur J Intl L 409.
67. Langille, “What is International Labour Law for?,” supra note 57.
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—guaranteeing “freedom of 
association” to all Canadians—from the fetters it had earlier imposed. This 
made the seemingly abstract and academic concern with basic narratives, 
and international labour law, very, very, legally real. And it was the Court’s 
misunderstanding of international labour law that first fired my interest in, 
and offered a door through which to enter, the constitutional debate.68
At the time of writing “Subset” I was a long way from this mode 
of understanding—but I was on my way to it. I was playing the game 
of constructing, or at least describing, what I would now, but could not 
then, see and call a “constituting narrative,” with the required three-part 
structure. In “Subset” the empirical slice of the world was employment. 
The key conceptual tools were the contract of employment, the employee 
(or independent contractor), and employer. The normative demand—
redressing inequality of bargaining power in the name of justice for 
employees. When writing “Subset” I knew what the slice of reality, 
and the conceptual apparatus were, instinctually it seems. It was what 
everyone knew. It went without saying. I added a bit of Dworkinian 
language but really, I was just along for the normative ride as well—it 
was all about justice for employees who suffered inequality of bargaining 
power. Everyone knew that. My insight was simply that we could unify 
two distinct subject matters with one story. But at no point at or near the 
time of writing of “Subset” was I aware of the game I was playing, or the 
road that was opening in front of me, invisibly.
Does this matter? Yes. It is progress to see how these constituting 
narratives are necessary to our thinking. This is so for many reasons. 
And there are many reasons just because these structures of thought are 
fundamental. They come before all the details and, indeed, tell us which 
details are the details. So, for example, our narratives hold the key to seeing 
how our labour law can go off the rails. Subjects like labour law, because 
they are made possible by way of a constituting narrative, can and do 
go off the rails along precisely the three dimensions that our constituting 
narrative provides—the setting of the empirical metes and bounds of our 
subject (employment), the concepts needed to legally frame it (contract 
of employment, employee, employer), and the normative project—
redressing power imbalances in contract negotiation in the name of decent 
terms for employees. This is, as Bruce and Claire show, our current three-
part problem. The world of work has moved on empirically, our concepts 
(employee, employer, etc) are not simply irrelevant but harmful in some 
68. Brian Langille “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get 
out of It” (2009) 54:1 McGill LJ 177.
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cases,69 and our normative vision with which they melded is now revealed 
as providing still valuable but now unsatisfyingly thin gruel. 
But beyond illuminating our current failures, the idea of a constituting 
narrative shows us what we need to do to get out of our current predicament. 
Simply put—we need a narrative that fits the world as we now find it, 
is not burdened by an outdated conceptual apparatus, and is driven by a 
more robust moral account of what we are trying to accomplish. These 
ideas also offer an important consoling thought—that our current set of 
problems, and the beginnings of a way forward, are to be found where 
most important problems are found—in the human mind.70
 And driving this final point home is a real life “kicker” which “Subset” 
“proves.” That I accepted what everyone knew back in 1980 and did 
not even see that I was participating in an existing compelling narrative 
demonstrates that these frameworks of thought can hold us captive. Get in 
our way without our seeing them. Silently, by intellectual inertial stealth, 
they become engines undermining our enterprise. This is, for example, my 
view of how best to explain the legal tragedy on display in many cases, 
from all corners of the labour market, from Faskens71 to Lian v J Crew.72 
Our concepts become not just irrelevant but obstructionist. Further, often 
empirical changes in the organization of work are motivated by just the 
insight that the current narrative immunizes the new arrangements from 
labour laws.73 Gradually it becomes clear that it is our normative thinking 
tied to a former reality, and demanding a certain legal framework, which is 
now the problem. Reading Sen brings this home. All this matters for labour 
lawyers, for workers, for our pursuit of justice. Both domestically and 
internationally. What we need is a new constituting narrative—one which 
is not limited to employment, or contract, or employees or employers, or 
inequality of bargaining power, or a limited view of the values of concern 
and respect. But also, more optimistically, there are good decisions that 
cannot be explained by the old narrative and that compel us lawyers to 
69. Brian Langille, “‘Take These Chains from My Heart and Set Me Free’: How Standard Labour 
Law Theory Drives Unnecessary Segmentation of Worker Rights” (2015) 36:2 Comp Lab L& Pol’y 
J [“Take These Chains”]; Brian Langille & Pnina Alon-Shenker “Law Firm Partners and the Scope of 
Labour Law” (2015) 4:2 Can J Human Rights 211.
70. In Brian Langille “Imagining Post ‘Geneva Consensus’ Labour Law for Post ‘Washington 
Consensus’ Development” (2010) 31:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 523, I rely on the writings of Joseph 
Stiglitz and Albert Hirschman to develop this idea in the labour law context.
71. McCormick v Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39 considered in  Langille & Alon-
Shenker, supra note 69.
72. Lian v Crew Group Inc, 2001 CanLII 28063, 54 OR (3d) 239 (ON SC) considered in Langille, 
“Take These Chains,” supra note 69.
73. What I now call de-contractualization: see Langille “The Political Economy of Decency,” supra 
note 45.
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seek not, then, just a new but also a better narrative, which can make 
sense of these decisions that leave the old story in legal disarray.74 At the 
international level the story is the same.75
This leads me back to my title, and to two problems going forward. 
The first is a terminological one—and Mark has addressed this. The second 
is one of undertaking the task of imagining a new normative view which 
could underwrite a new constituting narrative that would be adequate to 
our new empirical realities and a better legal approach to them.
In search for a formulation that addresses the terminological problem, 
Mark writes:
The quest for the unificatory formulation…is a difficult one. …I propose 
‘the Law of Work Relations’ as an over-arching terminology and concept 
to encapsulate our discipline. This may not command widespread favour, 
but it does sidestep the rift or remaining cracks between ‘labour law’ 
and ‘employment law’; and it does also, deliberately, break the barrier 
between ‘employment’ and ‘self-employment’ that still in my view 
manages to cramp and enclose the body of law that is the subject of our 
study and scholarship. Moreover, and I say this rather sadly, I think it 
helps to make another more subtle but also necessary transition in the 
way that we approach that subject. Just as an earlier generation had to 
lay the ghost of ‘master and servant law,’ so I believe we have to move 
past the perception that this body of law is constructed on the basis of the 
common law of the contract of employment, going towards a fuller and 
more rounded view of its essential sources. I hope this proposed concept 
and terminology might be slightly conducive in that direction.76 
“The law of work relations” is an excellent candidate. I would prefer 
simply “the law of work”—leaving off the word “relations” for reasons 
that we cannot explore fully here77 but I touch on below. I also grant that 
some of my own current formulations such as “the law governing the 
deployment of human capital”78 have clear disadvantages as a slogan. But 
I do not propose to solve this terminological problem here. There is a 
deeper question with which I shall finish—but also not here attempt to 
answer in a comprehensive manner.
When we ask the question “If labour law is a subset of employment law, 
what is employment law a subset of?” there is a deeper, non-terminological, 
74. See eg Robichaud v Canada (Treasury Board), 1987 CanLII 73, [1987] 2 SCR 84; United 
Steelworkers v Tim Hortons and others (No 2), 2015 BCHRT 168 (CanLII); British Columbia Human 
Rights Tribunal v Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62.
75. Langille, “What is International Labour Law For?,” supra note 57.
76. Freedland, supra note 13 at 24-25.
77. But see Brian Langille, “A Question of Balance in the Legal Construction of Personal Work 
Relations” (2013) 7 Jerusalem Rev Leg Studies 99. 
78. Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice,” supra note 57 at 112.
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problem. This is the problem of escaping labour law’s contractual frame. 
This is I think what Mark is saying in the quote above. But, in order to 
do that I think we need to drop not only the word “contractual” but also 
the word “relationship.” More profoundly, liberation from the legal frame 
of contract requires a similarly liberated normative account of what our 
labour law is for. Once we leave contract behind, we really do have to put 
aside the idea of protecting the weaker party in the negotiation of such 
contracts, by redressing “inequality of bargaining power,” as a possible 
normative touchstone. We need something at once broader and deeper. We 
need to escape the contractual noose of the received wisdom altogether.
That is why the work of Sen, Nussbaum, and the Capability Approach 
is, in my view, of such importance. An account of labour law drawing 
inspiration from those sources is what is required to underwrite a new and 
broader account of what labour law is, and why is worthy of our attention.79 
Bruce has summarized the key components of this approach and outlined 
how I have thus far attempted to deploy them in my efforts to outline a 
new constituting narrative. On that view what counts is the ability, the 
capability, to lead a life of real substantive human freedom. Education 
is increasingly evident as a key to human freedom and the capability to 
lead a life we have reason to value and worthy of human dignity.80 Human 
capability is, in my view, best seen as a better way of understanding the idea 
of “human capital.” My human capital is my set of capabilities. But human 
capital needs not only to be created via education, but to be deployed. 
Labour law is the law governing the deployment of human capital—of 
human productive activity—of, work. Its aim is to remove roadblocks and 
create pathways in that endeavor. All in the name of substantive human 
freedom. On this view productive activity is valuable and important in 
itself, and also as instrumental to other human freedoms. Most, if not all 
the components of traditional labour law are best seen in this new and 
larger light. But so much more will be seen to be relevant to our cause. 
On this view we do not start with contract. We certainly do not limit 
ourselves to a certain sort of contract (of employment). We do not require 
or seek a “relationship.” Rather, we focus upon the worker and we start 
with our various purposes—say of health and safety, or human rights, 
or freedom of association laws—and see them as part of the enterprise 
just described of removing obstacles (discrimination, unsafe working 
conditions) or creating paths at work, as part of advancing the goal of all 
79. Langille, “What is Labour Law?,” supra note 4.
80. See eg Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2020).
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our society’s striving, which is advancing the cause of the real substantive 
human capability to lead a life we have reason to value. This is not merely 
about redressing unequal contractual bargaining. It can be and is in part, 
but only as one means of pursuing our true ends. 
Further, on this approach we do not, in order to fix labour law’s “scope” 
of application, go hunting for exotic legal species such as “employees,” 
or “dependent contractors,” or “employers,” as if they existed in the 
real world. Rather, we rationally seek out those who are in a position to 
advance our purposes—those who can prevent the harms, remedy them 
when they occur, and who can and will respond to incentives and liability. 
Those are our “employers” if you still wish to use that term. And this is 
precisely what our new useful cases do, and the bad ones, with their teeth 
still sunk into the received wisdom, cannot and do not.81 Moreover, we will 
be driven to see that while some work law issues may be best regulated 
at the contractual level, many are not. We will see more attention paid to 
attaching important structures supporting human freedom as incidents of 
citizenship, not contract. And, in between contract and citizenship, we will 
need and build intermediate and new “platforms” at the level of career, or 
profession,  or geographic space, or skill set.82
Here is an important point of which labour lawyers should take special 
note: on Sen’s view of human freedom it is not only the destination, but 
the way there. The Capability Approach is a theory of real human agency. 
On this view it is not simply substantive results, but also how you get 
them, that counts. This is the very idea that Paul Weiler was giving voice 
to in his setting out of the case for freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.83 This is a new narrative of advancing the cause of human 
freedom, which is not biased against collective action. To the contrary—it 
reveals the true significance of freedom of association.84 
And a final brief and important alert—the Capability Approach is 
radically sensitive to all sorts of barriers to the deployment of human 
capital—child, and elder care for example. And much more. 
That is the path I have been trying to clear and understand as a way 
forward. This is the long-term project upon which I, unknowingly, had 
launched myself in 1980. Forty years later I still seek clarity as to what this 
81. Brian Langille, “Human Freedom: A Way out of Labour Law’s Fly Bottle” in Hugh Collins, 
Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2019).
82. Langille, “Labour Policy,” supra note 32.
83. Weiler, Reconcilable	Differences, supra note 46.
84. And reveals the inadequacy of the current SCC’s views on display in Mounted Police Association 
of Ontario, 2015 SCC 1; see Brian Langille, “The Condescending Constitution (or, The Purpose of 
Freedom of Association is Freedom of Association)” (2016) 19:2 CLELJ 335.
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means and where it will take us. The world has and will endure change. 
Unforeseeable change. The task of labour lawyers is, in my view, to see 
clearly how their discipline works, to liberate themselves from narratives, 
which have become unhealthy in the world as we now find it, and to seek a 
new narrative worthy of ourselves and our world. This is a large project. It 
is a vital project. It is the one in which Mark, Alan, Claire and Bruce, along 
with other leading thinkers, are actively engaged. I thank them for taking 
the time to help me see, more clearly, the history of my own experiences 
in that shared adventure.
A COVID postscript: As I write these words in the summer of 2020, in 
the blur of what I think of as “COVID Time,” it occurs to me that events 
may be overtaking these sorts of academic discussions. Our labour law 
is being pushed rapidly in new directions. These are directions that, I am 
bold enough to think, may help move us to see not just the desirability of 
the Capability Approach but its emerging reality. Governments, such as 
the Government of Canada, are responding to the crisis at work caused 
by the pandemic in required and radical ways. In constructing emergency 
benefits often no heed is paid to whether you are an employee or a contractor 
according to the received wisdom. Governments are directly topping up 
wages in underpaid and undervalued, but now revealed as “essential,” 
services. As employment-based health care and drug plan benefits expire 
we see calls for direct government provision. And so on. The full list of 
such initiatives internationally is long and provocative.85 I hope and expect 
there will be more. For example, how will we fully respond to what is now, 
in “COVID Time,” being revealed to us about our inability, in many parts 
of Canada, to adequately provide for our elders or secure our food supply? 
How much will we learn about the need to ensure that work is done—and 
in conditions fertile for, rather than corrosive of, human capabilities?
We do not know how or when all of this will end—neither the virus, 
nor the legal responses to it. Will this innovative sort of legal action be 
temporary? A determining factor will be whether we will be blinded 
to what is happening before our eyes by the limitations of the received 
wisdom—by what “everyone knows” about how to think about labour law. 
What everyone knows has nothing to do with what should, can, and even 
may, be so. The Capability Approach can enter and assist at this critical 
time and as follows: first, by removing the limiting lens of the received 
85. The Italian Labour Law e-Journal has just published a special issue: “Covid-19 and Labour Law. 
A Global Review” edited by Beryl ter Haar, Emanuele Menegatti, Elena Sychenko & Iacopo Senatori. 
It is open access, and available online: <https://illej.unibo.it> [https://perma.cc/67NC-QFDY]. 
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wisdom, and second, by giving us a way of “seeing,” and understanding, 
and embracing, what is going on. Right now.
